A "critical year" (April 1860-April 1861) : a study of Unionist sentiment in Western North Carolina during the culminating year of the secession movement by Ambrose, Robert Paul & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro

ROBERT PAUL AMBROSE.    A "Critical Year"   (April   1860  - April  1861): 
A Study of Unionist Sentiment   in Western North Carolina During the 
Culminating Year  of the Secession Movement.     (1975)     Directed by: 
Dr. Loren Schweninger.     Pp.   51. 
In  1860,  much of  the western part  of North Carolina was on the 
verge of economic "takeoff."    That   is not  to say this region was,   by 
any stretch of the  imagination,  an industrial society in  the same  light 
as  the manufacturing centers of the North.     It was,  however,  experiencing 
a time when the old  impediments and  resistances  to economic growth were 
finally being overcome.     Sustained prosperity was within the grasp of 
western Carolinians.     It   could be achieved by better  transportation 
systems   to open new markets,   technological  changes  to increase production, 
and  innovations to facilitate  further  industrialization.    The embryonic 
state of manufacturing in  1860 was the product of a half century of slow 
and often painful development;   its mere  presence  foretold of extensive 
industrial activity  in the  future.    The  growth pattern  in this area would 
resemble  that which was  begun decades  earlier in the North. 
The  economic needs  of the eastern section and of the cotton 
growing areas of southwestern North Carolina,  unlike those of the West, 
coincided with other areas  of  the South which were facing economic stag- 
nation.     For decades,  planters had been investing mainly in  slaves and  in 
land and  since the amount  of good  land was   limited each additional  invest- 
ment dollar brought a smaller return.     The only hope  for continued growth 
was   in the  opening of new lands  to be exploited by the "planter 
capitalists."    If this  could be done,   then,   for a period of  time,   invest- 
ments would bring substantial returns.    Most   importantly,  the future of 
the eastern and  southwestern parts of North Carolina were intertwined 
with the dominant southern  economic system.    Western Carolinians,   on the 
other hand, were moving toward  a diversified economy similar to that   in 
the North.     The attempt  by westerners  to block the secession movement 
must be seen as partly resulting from the particular state of economic 
development  of this  section and  the  subsequent psychological ties with 
the North. 
Of  critical  importance  in understanding the attitudes of western 
Carolinians  toward secession  is  to understand  this diversifying economic 
system, which goes  a long way  in explaining the strong Unionist  sentiment 
during the  "critical year," April  1860  to April 1861.    The infant   indus- 
tries  of western North Carolina relied heavily upon the  technological 
leadership of northern manufacturing centers.     Consequently,   there was 
among westerners  an incentive  to preserve the Union which was not  found 
in areas  dominated by slave  interests.     The Unionist response by western 
Carolinians  reflects  the seeds of  their expanding,   diversified  economy in 
the same  sense  that  the demand   for secession was the result  of an effort 
1 
to protect  the economic  interests of the planter-slavery society. 
Any paper  concerned with this  subject must acknowledge Joseph C. 
Sitterson's  book,  The  Secession Movement  in North Carolina.     This 
definitive study utilizes an exhaustive number of primary and  secondary 
sources  to present a scrutinizing account of the move toward  secession 
in North Carolina during the   twenty years prior to the outbreak of the 
Civil War.    The following manuscript,   "A Critical Year   .   .   .   ," examines 
many of the sources used by Dr.  Sitterson,  as well as other valuable 
materials which were not available  to him,   in order to present  the story 
and  the reasons   for  the pro-Unionist response by western Carolinians 
during the culminating year of the secession movement. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the western part of North Carolina there rises up a 
mountainous region with bold scenery and a more bracing climate than 
exists to the east.  This region and the land surrounding its long 
ridges and awesome precipices has a prevailing character of fertility. 
The forest trees and smooth undulating surfaces of waving grasses found 
in the Western Piedmont are magnificent sights.  The landscape is vari- 
egated by large tracts covered with dense forests of balsam fir trees 
and hardwoods alternating with grasslands filled with countless 
varieties of wildflowers.  From the sides of mountains rushing streams 
and broad rivers flow along the beautiful valleys which lie in the 
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shadows of the highest peaks in eastern United States. 
The inhabitants of this area have a common reverence for their 
homeland.  They seem to feel that their lives more than the lives of 
others are controlled by a superior law, the law of nature. This atti- 
tude is understandable since men who are intimate with nature are often 
more aware of her restrictions.  Daniel Webster, a native of a similar 
region, clearly understood the parameters of physical geography when he 
declared before the United States Senate on March 7, 1850, that despite 
the desires of some men, slavery was excluded from certain places by 
2"Debow's Review," Vol. XXIX, p. 658.  This region was sim- 
ilarly described by Senator Thomas Clingman to the North Carolina State 
Agricultural Society in 1860. 
Mother Nature herself.  Webster maintained that a profitable slave 
system would not endure unless the land on which that system is imple- 
mented could support a labor intensive and a large scale agriculture 
needed to effectively utilize slave labor. The counties situated in 
the mountains and Western Piedmont of North Carolina offered no such 
3 
conditions.  Here the farms were small, usually consisting of a house, 
barn and a few acres of cultivated land.  Most places had no slaves but 
those that did commonly had only between five and ten blacks who worked 
the fields side by side with their master and his family.  The insti- 
tution of slavery was not economically crucial to western Carolinians. 
In fact, workers were openly opposed to its existence. One contemporary 
writer observed that "it was noticeable that slavery, even in the days 
of greatest excitement over the slave question was of a milder type in 
western counties than elsewhere."  There was not only the common 
religious and philosophical opposition, but also the problem of many 
mechanics who found themselves competing with blacks for work.  Conse- 
quently, those not owning slaves disliked slavery because of the 
difficulty finding employment. 
Benjamin S. Hedrick, a professor at the University of North 
Carolina and a "westerner," acknowledged this when he observed that 
many is the time I have stood by a loaded emigrant wagon and given 
the parting hand to those faces I was never to look upon again. 
3In the ante-bellum period the Piedmont and Mountain region 
together were called the "West." 
4"Westerners," were unsympathetic to the expansionist policies 
of the slave aristocracy which dominated Southern society. However, 
they emphatically opposed abolition. 
5James S. Brawley, The Rowan Stor^ (Salisbury, N.C.:  The 
Rowan Printing Co.), p. 179. 
They were going to seek homes in the free west, knowing as they 
did that free and slave labor could not both exist and profit in 
the same area. 
Contemporary analysis of the economic effects of the slave 
system was relatively unsophisticated and most often distorted by the 
intense emotional feelings of the writers either for or against slavery. 
Hinton Rowan Helper, also a "westerner" and author of the controversial 
book Impending Crisis, insisted that slavery had ruined agriculture and 
made the South economically dependent upon the North.  Helper accused 
all slaveholders of being more despicable than thieves and murderers. 
Impending Crisis was so feared that it became unlawful to distribute the 
book in North Carolina.  On March 30, 1860, the Reverend Daniel Worth 
was sentenced to one year imprisonment for circulating the book. 
Governor Jonathan Worth later recalled that his cousin's "zeal got the 
better part of his discretion." 
But for every Southern writer who saw the economic disadvantages 
of slavery there were many more men who continued to argue that slavery 
had been profitable in the past and, therefore, should continue to be 
the basis of the Southern economy.  John Witherspoon Debow, an ardent 
secessionist and editor of the influential "Debow's Review," was such a 
man.  He maintained that slavery not only did not hurt the non- 
slaveholder, but was actually beneficial to him.  In his article, 
"Interest in Slavery of Southern Non-Slaveholders," Debow stated that 
the real wages of non-slaveholders were higher than those received by 
equally skilled northern workers. Apparently Debow's political motives 
impaired his economic analysis, at least as it applied to the situation 
'ibid., p. 179. 
in western North Carolina.  Even if the wage scale was as high as he 
suggested the fact remains that work which could be done by slaves would 
be denied their white competitors.  In Mecklenburg County "it was no 
uncommon thing to find the finest blacksmiths, carpenters, tanners, 
shoemakers and in fact all kinds of mechanics among the slaves."  From 
this evidence it must be assumed that the high wage scale was the result 
of a shortage of qualified workers in certain occupations. 
The farmers who lived in ante-bellum western North Carolina 
raised nearly everything for their domestic use.  This subsistance agri- 
Q 
culture restricted capital accumulation and as a result reinvestment. 
The farms remained relatively small.  Of the twenty-one counties in the 
state which did not contain a single plantation of 1000 acres, fifteen 
9 
were western counties.  To the planters of the east the yeomen farmers 
of the west were economically and socially backward and often regarded 
J. B. Alexander, History of Mecklenburg County, p. 125. 
Q 
As compared to the "planter capitalism" which existed where 
there was capital accumulation and reinvestment.  However, Eugene D. 
Genovese points out in The Political Economy of Slavery:  Studies in 
the Economics and Society of the Slave South, that this reinvestment was 
only along the same lines as the original investment, in slaves and land. 
This quantitative approach to economic progress, according to Genovese, 
brought economic stagnation.  Further evidence can be found in the 
Lindsay Patterson Papers.  There are a number of instances where farms 
in western counties were rented for corn which indicates a scarcity of 
money. 
Roser Howard Taylor, Slaveholding in North Carolina:  An 
Economic View.  Taylor also states that in the Mountain district only 
one county had more than 25% slaves and the percentage of slaves in 
this region declined in the period between 1840-1860 from 11% to 10.2%. 
as politically dangerous.   However, as they were removed from the 
political economy of the South so too were they separate from its dis- 
putes with the North over tariffs and the expansion of slavery into the 
territories.  Self-sufficient farmers and mechanics were indifferent to 
the commercial policies of these two societies as well as to any 
attempt by southern planter capitalists to avoid economic strangulation 
by spreading slavery into the territories. 
The yeomen farmers and mechanics of the mountains and western 
Piedmont of North Carolina understandably had little liking for the 
planter-capitalists or the institution of slavery.  These people, whose 
lifesblood came from "lackadaisical digging in forlorn cornpatches" 
were, as workers, forced to compete with slaves for jobs and, as pro- 
ducers, left out of the market economy because of geographical 
restrictions.  Zebulon Vance, a United States Congressman from Ashville, 
would recall after the War that "seven tenths of our people (westerners) 
held no slaves at all and to say the least of it, felt no great and 
enduring enthusiasm for its (slavery's) preservation." 
These "southern Yankees" were only on the periphery of the 
dominant southern society.  They were mechanics competing with slaves 
for work.  They were farmers producing outside the realm of a market 
economy.  They would soon become soldiers fighting in a war created by 
10According to Genovese, planters did not want to appropriate 
State funds to build a transportation system into the back country 
because they did not want to increase the economic strength of the 
small farmers by opening new markets.  Farmers, on the other hand, 
consistently voted in support of State aid for internal improvements. 
UJ. A. Sloan, North Carolina in the War Between the States, 
p. 101. 
what, to them, were uncritical issues.  Slavery, states' rights, "Black 
Republicanism," and the tariff question were all around during the 
1850's but the west remained indifferent to the secession movement.  In 
the "critical year" between April 1860 and April 1861, these men stub- 
bornly withstood the increasing desire for secession which came from 
the east and south.  Ultimately, however, after Lincoln's call for 
troops on April 15, 1861, the majority of westerners complied with the 
demands of radicals and "let the Union rip." This region, where in 
1861 "slave owners were so rare that the institution of slavery may be 
12 
said practically to have had no existence,"  sent more than 15,000 
fighting men into battle.  The story of events which led the western 
counties of North Carolina to that decision is the subject of this 
paper. 
12J.   P.   Arthur,  Western North Carolina:     A History   (Raleigh, 
North Carolina:     Edwards and Boughton,   1914),   p.   636. 
Map No. 1 on page 8 shows the area considered in this paper. 
A tier of counties in southwestern North Carolina has been 
excluded because it lies within the "cotton belt" and consequently 
must be regarded as part of the "planter-slavery" region. 
Map No. 2 on page 9 shows the density of slave population in 
North Carolina in 1860.  It should be noted that the majority of 
counties considered in this paper had less than 5 slaves per square 
mile whereas the statewide average was 9.5 slaves per square mile. 
This is a copy of a map found in Roser Howard Taylor's, 
Slaveholding in North Carolina: An Economic View, p. 50. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE POLITICAL CONVENTIONS TO THE 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
1860 was an election year.  This political year, however, was 
more crucial than past ones, for the country's survival might well be 
at stake.  Over a decade of intense hostility between northerners and 
southerners had created an apparently irreconcilable rivalry between 
these two sectors of the country.  Consequently the task before 
Americans was to find a suitable candidate within their political party 
who represented the philosophy of the sector in which they lived and 
to insure his election. 
Democrats began first by calling a convention at Charleston in 
April of 1860.  At this meeting the severity of tension between the 
North and South was first revealed when the platform committee pre- 
sented three conflicting recommendations to the body of the Convention. 
Of these, the majority resolution embodied the principles of "states' 
rights" and promoted southern extremists' demands for Congressional 
protection of slavery and their right to expand that institution into 
the territories.  This proposal was defeated by powerful northern 
delegates who in turn supported the first of two minority reports which 
proposed that the doctrine of popular sovereignty as it was presented 
in the Cincinnati Platform of 1856 be accepted. At the same time, 
northerners voted for the rejection of a second minority resolution 
calling for Supreme Court jurisdiction concerning the expansion of 
10 
11 
slavery Into the territories.  This action was expected by everyone 
since a majority of the Supreme Court judges were southerners and could 
be expected to support the spread of slavery. 
The defeat of this report combined with the acceptance of an 
anti "states' rights" platform caused a iuror among many southern 
delegates. "  The following day the delegations from Alabama, Mississ- 
ippi, Louisiana, Florida, and a majority of delegates from South 
Carolina, Arkansas and Georgia left the Convention disgusted with 
14 
northern colleagues.   The fractured convention which remained after 
the walkout was unable to find a nominee for the party.  For fifty- 
seven ballots the delegates from the majority of northern states stood 
behind their choice, Stephen A. Douglas, refusing to accept a com- 
promise candidate.  Consequently, in an atmosphere of despair, the 
convention was adjourned to meet at Baltimore on June 18, 1860. 
The interim between the two Democratic conventions was filled 
with political activity.  Baltimore, where an unprecedented twin 
Democratic ticket would be presented, produced the Constitutional Union 
Party and another pair of candidates entered what was becoming a 
political stampede.  The new party was pieced together from the remains 
of the old Whig Party and the southern wing of the American Party. 
13Dwight L. Dumond, The Secession Movement 1860-1861 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1931), pp. 37-38.  Dumond points out that much of the hos- 
tility between Douglas and "states' rights" men was due to resentment 
by southerners that of fifteen states in which the popular vote of 
Lincoln was to exceed those for Douglas, Breckenridge and Bell combined, 
twelve sent their delegations to the Democratic National Convention 
instructed for Douglas.  They represented 120 votes on the floor, 19 
more than one-third. 
14 
Ibid., p. 40. 
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John Bell of Tennessee, a former United States Congressman and Secre- 
tary of War, and Edward Everett, former Governor of Massachusetts and 
President of Harvard University, were the standard bearers. The 
Unionist platform purposely avoided the slavery issue and emphasized 
national patriotism.  The delegates from the twenty-four states which 
participated believed the country was tired of the slave question and 
would rally behind a call for unity.  Nevertheless, the platform was 
distinctly pro-Southern. Although it recognized no principles other 
than "the Constitution of the country, the union of the States, and the 
enforcement of laws,"  it did not commit its endorsers to uphold the 
Union under all circumstances.  On the contrary, the motive of the 
Unionist platform was to guarantee "states' rights." It did not uphold 
the idea of majority rule but rather insisted upon Constitutional pro- 
tection of the rights of the Southern minority. This was a 
revitalization of Calhoun's "concurrent majority" theory.  "Unionists" 
assumed the country would remain whole. 
With this philosophy in mind, "Unionists" denounced Douglas' 
advocation of popular sovereignty as an infringement upon states' rights 
and criticized the Breckenridge platform for precipitating disunion. 
John Bell and Edward Everett became very popular in old Whig strongholds 
such as western North Carolina.  In this conservative area their 
neutrality toward the slave issue and their plea for unionism were 
especially welcome. 
In Chicago, on May 18, a darkhorse candidate named Abraham 
15 
16 
Ibid., p. 93. 
Ibid., p. 96. 
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Lincoln was nominated as the Republican Presidential standard bearer. 
Though his personal beliefs concerning slavery were relatively unknown 
at the time, he lost any chance for Southern support when the Con- 
vention presented him with a distinctly anti-Southern platform. 
Republicans 
denied that slavery was based in common law, denied that Congress 
or territorial legislatures had the right to establish it in any 
of the territories and denounced the principles of nonintervention 
and popular sovereignty as deceptions and frauds, and defined the 
doctrine of right of secession as treason.17 
These statements made Lincoln and his running mate, Hannibal Hamlin, 
unsuccessful candidates in all areas of North Carolina.  They were to 
receive one percent of the vote the following November. 
The first days of summer were approaching when Democrats 
finally reconvened in Baltimore to again try to find a nominee for 
their badly divided party.  The first order of business was to determine 
the status of the disaffected delegates. Members immediately decided 
that the seats of those who bolted at Charleston were to remain vacant 
unless they were refilled by another vote of their constituents.  This 
obvious anti-Southern action led to another walkout. This time a 
majority of delegates from the border states of Virginia, North 
1 o 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Kentucky left.   The Southern states were 
now virtually unrepresented.  The rump convention which remained was 
free to nominate Stephen Douglas and Herscel V. Johnson and to adopt 
the original majority resolution which embraced the idea of popular 
17Ibid., p. 96. 
1 Joseph C. Sitterson, The Secession Movement in North Carolina 
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), 
pp. 161-169.  (All but three of the North Carolina delegates left.) 
14 
sovereignty.  This ticket was, of course, unacceptable to most southern 
Democrats, including those from North Carolina and the other border 
19 
states. 
Five days later, on June 23, in an effort to find a candidate 
who more closely adhered to southern ideology, the delegates of the 
seventeen dissenting states met, again at Baltimore, and nominated John 
C. Breckenridge of Kentucky and Joseph Lane of Oregon.  The delegates 
of this seceders convention, in a bid to gain recognition of their 
rights within the territories, adopted the original majority platform 
which had been rejected at Charleston two months earlier.  Breckenridge 
men entered the race with the hope that Unionists would come to their 
senses and support Breckenridge in order to defeat the "Black Repub- 
, .    ..20 licans. 
During the summer of 1860, for the first and only time in the 
nation's history, four presidential candidates came before the American 
people.  In the ensuing months emotional and hard fought campaigns 
enveloped nearly all of the states.  The contest in North Carolina was 
clearly between John Bell and John Breckenridge.  The western counties 
became a unit supporting John Bell and the preservation of the Union. 
Prominent citizens of this area began to speak out against the disunion 
spirit which was brewing in the large slaveholding, Breckenridge 
counties to the east.  On June 8, Reverend J. Buxton of Ashville wrote 
a relative that he believed 
19Douglas received only a few thousand votes from the entire 
state of North Carolina that November. 
20It should be noted that even if Bell's votes were given to 
Breckenridge, Lincoln still would have won the election. 
15 
the disunion mania to be a practical blindness and a jereboom 
scheme against God and man.  Mr. Everett's letter is a states- 
manlike production and Washingtonian throughout. A sectionalized 
politician on the slavery question pro or con is my abomination, 
object of my implacable disgust. We want breadth, patriotism, 
moderation, honesty and my opinion is (which however I do not 
preach) that we won't find any of these things at large in either 
the Democratic or Republican parties. * 
Reverend Buxton's mode of conservatism prevailed in western counties. 
Slavery was neither wanted nor needed there and as a result the pro- 
ponents of that institution found no more support than could be gotten 
from ambivalence.  Whenever anyone went so far as to argue that 
secession might be necessary to protect the slave institution, 
westerners such as Samuel Johnston quickly responded that "the people 
here are too great to be dashed to pieces by the folly or the madness 
22 
of...politicians for their personal aggrandizement." 
Reverend Buxton and Samuel Johnston, along with their Unionist 
colleagues, rallied behind the influential newspapers, such as the 
Weekly Raleigh Register, an old Whig paper, to accuse Breckenridge men 
of using the doctrine of "states' rights" as a method to dissolve the 
23 
Union if they could not hold office under it. "  Westerners contended 
that when a state entered the Union by adopting the Constitution it did 
not retain the right of secession, but by such action consented to seek 
the preservation of its rights by means provided by the Constitution. 
21J. Buxton to Ralph Buxton, Ashville, June 8, 1860.  Ralph 
Potts Buxton Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 
22Pettigrew Family Papers, Southern Historical Collection 
(University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C). 
23Weekly Raleigh Register, February 8, 1860. 
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Accordingly, Breckenridge men violated the Constitution by insisting 
that a state could nullify or secede if it so desired.  Ratification 
made these rights void, and state sovereignty became limited by the 
guidelines set forth by the Constitution. 
During the initial months of the "critical year", Democrats 
countered the attacks of Unionists by simply asserting the rights of 
nullification—that a state could remain within the Union while 
complying with only the laws which were beneficial to the said state 
—and secession—that a state had voluntarily entered the Union 
reserving the right to withdraw at its own will. Again, adherents to 
this philosophy were generally found in areas where slavery was 
regarded as an economic necessity.  This was the essence of their 
argument against anti-slavery legislation perpetrated by the federal 
government. 
It is important to realize that neither the majority of North 
Carolinian Unionists nor Democrats advocated secession at this time. 
Moreover, as late in the campaign as November, the only secessionist 
papers in the state were the Raleigh State Journal, the Goldsboro Rough 
Notes, and the Charlotte Bulletin.  The argument was theoretical, at 
least for the moment.  Breckenridge men maintained the right of 
secession but they were not ready to carry out that privilege.  The 
mood of the vast number of Democrats in North Carolina was perhaps best 
expressed by William Holden, editor of their chief political organ, the 
North Carolina Standard.  Holden had originally favored Douglas because 
he felt he was more likely to defeat Lincoln than was Breckenridge.  As 
the campaign progressed it became apparent that Breckenridge was the 
17 
stronger candidate in North Carolina.  For this reason, Holden shifted 
his support to the Breckenridge ticket, but continued to plead for 
caution and oppose the idea of "disunion for existing causes." An 
editorial revealing the position of the Standard as well as most North 
Carolina Democrats appeared in the North Carolina Standard on July 11, 
1860.  Holden wrote: 
North Carolina has been for the space of seventy years a member of 
the federal Union.  She entered this great sisterhood of States 
after mature deliberation.  She did so believing she would thereby 
best promote her own interests, and more effectually than in any 
other situation protect herself from the encroachments by foreign 
states. 
The editor maintained that certain conditions must occur before 
North Carolina could leave this Union: 
Some great cause must move her- some great wrong must either be 
inflicted or must overshadow her, before she will contemplate her 
own act of severance from the Union.  She feels that while Virginia 
and Tennessee and Maryland, and Kentucky are safe in the Union she 
will be safe also; and that her honor, as sensitive and untarnished 
as theirs, has been confided to her own keeping, and not to that 
of South Carolina, Alabama and Mississippi.  She is a breadstuff 
rather than a 'cotton-State'.  Her interests are central among the 
southern states relying as she does for protection not more on the 
slaveholding states to the south of her than on those of the north 
and west. 
Holden called upon Unionists to: 
cling to such a Union as 'the mariner clings to his last plank 
when night and the tempest close around him'.  As long as the 
Constitution is preserved inviolate we shall have nothing to fear. 
It will be time enough when that instrument, which is the bond of 
the Union, shall have been broken, or its spirit disregarded, to 
dissolve existing relations and provide new guards for future 
security.24 
2ANorth Carolina Standard, July 11, 1861.  William Holden was 
probably Unionist in North Carolina at this time.  His views accurately 
reflect the attitudes of Unionists from western North Carolina. 
18 
This editorial was a response by moderate Democrats to the 
radical wing of their party.  It also expressed the sentiment of most 
westerners, with the exception of those who already pledged to "go with 
the Union until the lanes end." There was, however, this subtle dif- 
ference between the position taken by moderate Democrats and that of 
their more conservative counterparts of the Whig stronghold to the west. 
The "great cause" which would warrant disunion was not a prescribed 
event.  Many democrats believed that Lincoln's election would be reason 
to dissolve the Union.  Others thought that Lincoln should be given a 
fair trial and if his actions were anti-Southern, then that should 
bring secession.  Most westerners, however, stood against secession. 
Since slavery was not an intimate part of their economy, anti-slave 
legislation was not an immediate threat to their welfare. Under- 
standably they did not want to risk bringing on a bloody war over such 
uncritical circumstances. 
During the early summer much time was given to local and state 
elections.  By August 9, the returns had been published in local 
newspapers and peoples' attention focused away from Pool Versus Ellis 
and the ad velorum question to the national presidential race.  The 
west became noticeably more vocal than it had been that spring.  The 
few newspapers there at last began to choose sides.  On August 24, the 
Iredell Express, an influential Unionist newspaper, criticized 
Douglas' "squatter sovereignty" policies, but was more vehemently 
opposed to Breckenridge for supporting these policies at Cincinnati in 
1856 and then coming out against them in 1860.  Breckenridge was also 
accused of once being allied with abolitionists and free soilers such 
19 
as B. F. Hallet of Massachusetts.  In that same issue, editor Eugene 
B. Drake wrote that: 
the only chance there is to defeat Lincoln and save the country, 
will be for the conservative, Union loving men of all parties— 
to lay aside their party predelictions and vote for Bell and 
Everett.  They must do this or Lincoln will be elected inevitably; 
and as inevitable will the Union be dissolved, and a scene of 
bloodshed and anarchy will ensue that never was witnessed before 
in any country. " 
During the late summer a number of other western newspapers 
came out for John Bell.  The Western Advocate, which was renamed the 
Ashville Spectator, Western Carolinian and the Carolina Watchman all 
supported the Constitutional Union Party.  These papers, like the 
Iredell Express, regarded John Bell as the more likely candidate to 
defeat Lincoln and further denounced Breckenridge for advocating 
secession as a way to insure southern rights. The federal government 
was viewed as "the fairest and best on God's earth" and those who would 
destroy it were guilty of a wicked crime.  Western "Unionist" papers 
saw no just complaint against the government, especially anything which 
warranted disunion. They opposed the whole secession movement and 
sought to convince the people of North Carolina that their interests 
were bound up in the Union, not in the thralldom of "King Cotton." 
Those western newspapers which had been traditionally demo- 
cratic in most cases continued to support their party's nominees.  The 
papers were forced to mold their candidates to be acceptable within an 
area of such extreme Union sentiment.  For example, the Ashville News, 
edited by Thomas W. Atkins, supported Breckenridge for President and 
Ellis for Governor. On July 4 in an editorial expounding upon the 
25 Iredell Express, August 24, 1860. 
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merits of these men, the News referred to both as "firmly insisting 
upon all the Constitutional rights of the South" while being "moderate, 
conservative Union men."   A few months after the summer elections, 
newly elected Governor Ellis wrote to Robert Gaurdin in South Carolina 
that "we (North Carolina) will stand by you (South Carolina) to the 
death whether in or out of the Union." Governor Ellis was after all a 
secessionist.  Western democratic newspapers had tried to hide this 
o 7 
behind a disguise of "Constitution and Union"  in order to make both 
Ellis and Breckenridge more appealing to their conservative readers. 
Nevertheless, it remained that men whose loyalty to the Union was 
questionable would not be popular in western counties. 
In the months preceding the election, well known Southerners 
who favored the Breckenridge ticket came out for disunion.  This made 
it seem even more certain that secession was the aim of his supporters. 
"We shall fire the Southern heart, instruct the Southern mind, give 
courage to each other and at the proper moment, by one organized 
concerted action we can precipitate the Cotton States into revolution, 
.,28 
proclaimed William Yancey.  J. T. Morgan exclaimed, "If I had the power 
29 
I would dissolve this government in two minutes,"  while John D. F. 
26Ashville News, July A, 1860. 
27"Constitution and Union" was the motto of the Salisbury 
Banner.  This paper's editor, John Spelman, became as active for the 
Democratic Party as was J. J. Bruner of the Carolina Watchman for the 
opposition as evidenced by the appearance of his name as secretary of 
several Democratic meetings held in Rowan County. 
28 Iredell Express, August 17, 1860. 
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Williams bitterly exclaimed that he would "break up and dissolve this 
rotten Yankee government"  if it were up to him.  Statements such as 
these helped to label all Breckenridge men as secessionists even though 
the vast majority of North Carolina Democrats still opposed immediate 
secession.  These spokesmen made it seem unlikely to westerners that 
Breckenridge and Lane were as much for Constitution and Union as some 
newspapers portrayed them.  This fact hurt the Democratic ticket in 
western counties, but to make matters worse, a committee in Columbia, 
South Carolina, headed by John Witherspoon Debow, agreed that in the 
event of the election of Lincoln the South should secede.  Further, 
leading newspapers reported that South Carolina Breckenridge men had 
formulated a plan to take the South out of the Union even before the 
election.  This plot involved the violent seizure of the federal forts 
by volunteers from the "Cotton States." It was hoped that such action 
would force other slave-holding states into the league.  North Carolina 
and Virginia would become the likely battleground and would therefore 
be unable to remain neutral. 
Despite these obvious movements toward disunion, the "West 
remained a stalwart against the growing secessionist pressure. Union 
men fervently opposed what to them were despicable ideas brewing in 
the "deep South" and in the slave counties of eastern North Carolina. 
On October 5, the Iredell Express reported that "our mountain friends 
are being thoroughly aroused in behalf of the Union, Constitution and 
the enforcement of laws."31 Most western counties called special 
30 
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meetings to reassert the resolutions which they had passed the previous 
winter.  For example, in January the Whigs of Wilkes County resolved 
that: 
we, the Whigs of Wilkes County are decidedly in favor of the Union 
of these states as they now exist and are determined to oppose all 
efforts come from what source they may, that either does or tends 
to weaken the bonds of Union under which we live; and that we 
pledge ourselves to maintain the Union and Constitution as they now 
exist as long as they afford the protection to our lives and 
property that they do.-" 
In October, the citizens of Wilkes County met again to reaffirm that 
position. 
Other meetings were held throughout western North Carolina to 
openly condemn the actions of the ever growing and more vocal group of 
disunionists.  On October 11, "The Great Union Meeting," described as 
"the largest gathering held in North Carolina since the days of 
1840,"  was held in Salisbury. Four days before the election, five 
thousand people met at Wilkesboro to hear leading Unionists, including 
Zebulon Vance, Honorable J. M. Leach and Dr. J. G. Ramsey argue in 
favor of preserving the Union.  Similar sessions were held in other 
western cities and towns until that part of the state became an orgy 
of oratory expressing an intense devotion to the Union. 
During the final days of the presidential campaign, concern 
over the effects of a "black Republican" administration continued to 
grow throughout North Carolina. The people of the state reacted to 
this potential threat in one of three ways. On one extreme 
32 
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meetings were also held in Caldwell, Macon, Wildes, Surrey, Iredell, 
Yancy, Buncombe, Madison and Henderson Counties. 
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secessionists insisted that Lincoln's election would be sufficient 
reason for disunion.  In North Carolina, "secessionists" were found 
predominantly in counties with large slave populations.  Their most 
influential leaders included Governor Ellis and Senator Thomas Cling- 
man.  In the middle the majority of North Carolinians shared the belief 
that Lincoln's election by itself would not be cause for any state to 
leave the Union.  This group of "conditional Unionists" adopted a 
policy of "watch and wait" and maintained that even if the Republicans 
were victorious the South would still control two of the three depart- 
ments of government and could therefore block any inimical legislation. 
On the other extreme, "unconditional Unionists" vowed to preserve the 
Union at all costs and regarded the idea of "right of secession" as an 
absurdity.  The relatively few adherents to this policy came mostly 
from the far west and were to remain faithful to the United States 
Government throughout the Civil War. 
It must be noted that gradations of opinion existed within the 
three groups, especially among "conditional Unionists." "Conditional 
Unionists," as stated earlier, did not agree upon what action would 
constitute sufficient cause for seceding.  In fact, many eastern 
Democrats who were being influenced by Senator Clingman and Governor 
Ellis were leaning toward disunion before the election.  On the other 
hand, most westerners were firmly opposed to the whole idea.  B. F. 
Eller, member of a prominent Wilkes County political family, wrote, 
24 
...the good old State is not as much of a turncoat as he is 
(Clingman). Neither are willing to unfurl the great flag of our 
Country for the cause of Lincoln's election until we have seen 
that his actions require such an act to be done.3Z| 
Eller seems to reflect the opinion of most westerners and his statement 
is supported by the areas' newspapers. 
In the days just before the election, the number of people who 
favored secession steadily increased as it became apparent that Lincoln 
quite possibly would be the next President of the United States. 
Despite this added pressure, the fidelity of the "West" toward the Union 
remained unfaltering, as evidenced by the large Whig vote on November 6, 
and by the numerous pro-Union meetings which were held during the 
following months. 
*F. W. Johnston, "The Papers of Zebulon B. Vance," State 
Department of Archives and History, Raleigh, 1963, p. 74.  Eller called 
Clingman a turncoat because he believed that the Senator wanted 
secession in order to become President of the Confederacy. 
For example, on October 26, the Iredell Express told her 
readers that "we do not assert that the election of Mr. Lincoln by a 
constitutional majority would be a cause for dissolution of the Union; 
we do not hold any such doctrine." 
CHAPTER III 
THE ELECTION TO THE INAUGURATION 
OF LINCOLN 
Prior to Election Day most editorials in local and state news- 
papers dealt with the effect that an "anti-slavery" administration 
would have upon the country.  Since no one, including westerners, 
thought that a Lincoln victory would do anything to unify the North and 
South, concern was expressed as to the extent to which the nation would 
be further divided by his administration and whether the South would 
have any honorable choice but to secede.  Western North Carolina news- 
papers warned people that the great question to be settled at the polls 
was whether Constitution and Union would be maintained or whether the 
South would break up the Union and begin a bloody civil war.  Union men 
maintained that a Republican victory would increase dissension between 
North and South.  If people on both sides used restraint, the Country 
could be saved.  They openly condemned radicals who, in the days before 
the election, proclaimed that a Lincoln victory would be "the death 
knell of the Union," and if such an event occurred the country would 
last only a few months. 
The election of Lincoln on November 6, 1860, was dreaded by 
nearly all North Carolinians.  For the first time in the nation's 
history the government would be headed by a purely sectional party; and 
to make matters worse for southerners, that party represented interests 
25 
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which conflicted with their own.  Conservative newspapers recommended 
that everything possible be done to save the Union.  On November 12, 
the Weekly Raleigh Register asked the people of North Carolina to give 
Lincoln a fair trial before making any decision.36 The Greensboro 
Patriot (November 19) did not approve of Lincoln's election but called 
37 
for tolerance and caution.   The Iredell Express (November 23) argued 
that the result of the election was not just cause to leave the Union 
because the President-elect would not have enough authority to injure 
the South.   He, like Buchanan, would have to contend with Congress 
and the Supreme Court, both of which were controlled by Southerners. 
One moderate Democratic newspaper, which sustained the position 
taken by the conservative press, was the influential North Carolina 
Standard.  Editor William Holden headed what was perhaps the most 
effective pro-Union campaign in the state of North Carolina.  Holden's 
skillfully written editorials accurately convey the sentiment of all 
strong Union men resulting in a strong following of readers in the 
western part of the state.  In an article entitled "Disunion for 
Existing Causes," Holden gave the most persuasive argument against 
"disunion" following Lincoln's election. 
A Confederacy or Union composed of the fifteen slave-holding 
States would, after a while, encounter some of the same diffi- 
culties which now beset the existing Union.  The States south of 
us would produce and export cotton, while the middle or 'bread- 
stuff States would become deeply interested in manufactures. 
36 
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Foreigners from Europe and the North would pour into the latter 
and push the slave population farther south. Manufacturers would 
demand and obtain protection, and free labor would contend with 
and root out slave labor in the Middle States, until at length 
the latter could commence to agitate against the cotton States as 
the North is now agitating against us. 
Holden maintained that: 
Our honor as a people is still untarnished - our Constitu- 
tional rights, so far as the federal government is concerned, are 
still untouched.  If the federal government should attempt even 
to tarnish the one or to deprive us of the other, we for one would 
be ready to resist, and ready to dissolve the Union without regard 
to consequences.  But not now!  The slave holder, whose property 
civil war would involve in imminent peril, says not now!  If we 
must dissolve the Union, let us do it as one people, and not by a 
fair majority.  Let us wait until the people of the State are more 
united on the subject than they are now.-" 
A great number of North Carolinians disagreed with the moderate 
position taken by the Standard and the many pro-Union papers of the 
West.  During the later part of November and December, meetings "which 
were noticeably absent in western counties"  were organized to muster 
support for disunion in an attempt to take control of the state away 
from the Unionists.  On November 20, Governor Ellis suggested to the 
Legislature that a conference of southern states and a convention in 
North Carolina be called to consider the question of secession. These 
post-election maneuvers by Secessionists made it obvious that despite 
earlier promises a Lincoln victory would not justify separation; the 
election of a "black Republican" did in reality pose a sufficient 
threat against "planter aristocracy" interests to further the cause of 
separatists.  This group, headed by Governor Ellis and Senator Clingman, 
became larger and more influential after November sixth.  People living 
39North Carolina Standard, December 1, 1860. 
40Sitterson, op_. cit., p. 140. 
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in the southwestern counties, where land and slave prices fell rapidly 
as a result of the Republican victory, began to find the arguments for 
secession in order to protect southern rights very convincing.  The 
position of the Ellis-Clingman faction was definitely strengthened by 
the outcome of the Presidential Election. 
Unionists confronted the expanding influence of their 
opponents by simply reasserting their previous position at "Union 
meetings," in newspaper editorials and before the North Carolina 
Legislature.  Probably the most accurate summary of the attitudes held 
by most westerners was described in a series of resolutions introduced 
in the House by Dennis Ferebee.  His proposal stated that: 
1) the Constitution of the United States is not a compact of 
sovereign States; 2) that no State can withdraw from the Union 
without revolution; 3) that it is the duty of North Carolina to 
defend the rights of the Union, and 4) that the election of Abe 
Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin is not sufficient cause for dis- 
solution. ■*• 
During the period between November 6, 1860 and the secession of South 
Carolina on December 20, 1860, the principles of Ferebee's bill, which 
were nearly identical to the resolutions made at the western county 
meetings nearly a year prior to this time, were the substance of the 
reasoning offered by "westerners" against disunion for "existing 
causes." 
At one o'clock on December 20, South Carolina left the Union; 
so began the secession winter of 1861. North Carolina soon witnessed 
a bitter struggle between Unionists and secessionists. One distressed 
westerner exclaimed that, "I have never in all my public life, met with 
41 North Carolina Standard,  November 27,   1860. 
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so much recklessness, so much violence and tyranny as I have here this 
winter among the disunionists."42 The "reckless" display of power by 
North Carolina disunionists following the secession of South Carolina 
made it clear to Union men that time was not on their side.  The trend 
was now toward secession and they would have to take positive action. 
Attempts at compromise had repeatedly failed.  The Crittenden proposal, 
a package of six Constitutional amendments, institutionalized the prin- 
ciples of the Missouri Compromise and, thereby, guaranteed that slavery 
would be recognized south of 36° 30'. This plan was rejected by 
Northern leaders who envisioned annexing all of Mexico and Central 
America.  They saw no reason to allow slavery to monopolize their antici- 
pated acquisitions. A Central Confederacy was hoped for by Zeb Vance 
and was overwhelmingly supported by most western counties.  Evidently 
the idea grew out of a statement made by Henry Clay to Senator Graham 
of North Carolina nearly twenty years earlier.  Clay had said, 
There are four states in this Union which in its conformation bear 
to it about the same position that the heart does to the human 
body; as long as they are quiet and contented there is no danger 
of disunion, but if they shall become dissatisfied and restless, 
trouble will not be far off; these States are Virginia, North 
Carolina, Tennessee and Kentucky. 43 
The idea of a Central Confederacy never had widespread recognition. 
Disunionists were, by now, too confident that they would achieve their 
goal and had nothing to gain by compromise. 
William Barney, Road to Secession (New York:  Praeger 
Publishers), p. 194. 
A3Major William A. Graham, "The North Carolina Union Men of 
Eighteen Hundred Sixty-one," North Carolina Booklet, Vol. XI, July 
1911, p. 9. 
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Efforts to curtail the disunion sentiment by dealing directly 
with the leaders of the secessionist group had failed.  Conservatives 
now used the only course of action left to them.  In the State Legis- 
lature, and in meetings throughout North Carolina, they attempted to 
convince the rank and file of the Democratic Party to break away from 
irresponsible radicals, notably Ellis and Clingman, and join the cause 
of the Union.  It was for this purpose that, in early January, Bedford 
Brown, of Rowan County, asked the Senate and the people of North 
Carolina whether they were ready for such a resolution. 
Are you ready to lay violent hands on the fairest and best 
governmental fabric on God's earth and all your own distinguishing 
you as the most favored people in the world, and tear it in pieces, 
thus depriving yourselves and your children of their birthright. 
You have no just complaint - not even a shadow of a complaint 
against the Government; and if you commit this wickedness in the 
sight of this age of civilization and religion, you will call down 
upon your guilty heads the amassed curses and reproaches of the 
whole world.  Your children for generations to come as they shall 
read the wonderful history of the Country established under the 
pure and patriotic fathers of the Revolution and its needless 
destruction by you will curse you. 
Brown's purpose was to shame secessionists.  Paradoxically, he urged 
people not to allow "passion" to direct them, but at the same time 
expounded upon the emotional impact that a civil war would have upon 
the children of future generations as they read their history lessons. 
State Senator Brown's type of argument is typical of the 
methods of persuasion used by both the Union and the disunion groups 
during December and most of January. At this time there was no issue 
important enough to occupy the attention of the disputing factions. 
Consequently, during the months following the Presidential election, 
44 Carolina Watchman,  January 15,  1861. 
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the rivalry was characterized by emotionalism and name calling.  The 
Carolina Watchman pointed out that the people on both sides had their 
minds made up about secession and excepting some earth shattering 
occurrence they would not change their opinions.   Radicals maintained 
that the State had no choice but to secede. Westerners and all con- 
servatives said that the preservation of the Union was vital to the 
interests of North Carolina.  Both used every opportunity to promote 
their cause. 
In the West, Union meetings were held in every county to offer 
support for the federal government.  These meetings were criticized by 
disunion men for being submissionist and for supporting an abolition 
government headed by a base negro-equality administration.  The 
Carolina Watchman, a western paper, responded to the attacks of 
secessionists. A January editorial described the opinion of most west- 
erners concerning disunionists and their reason for meeting.  It read: 
The people of Rowan are utterly opposed to such terrible folly. 
They believe it is easier, safer and better, to seek a redress for 
grievances in the Union than out of it; and hence they meet 
together in the county meeting and so declare themselves.  They are 
not untrue to their rights, and sensible men, North and South know 
it.  They do not desire, nor do they expect by a menacing attitude 
to accomplish what may be better accomplished by argument, and by 
an appeal to fairness, justice and truth It is then to save our 
Country from horrors, to preserve our independence and secure the 
continued prosperity of all our interests that Union meetings are 
held; and with these motives for action the Union men will 
struggle while there is hope. 
This western newspaper delineates the attitudes of its predominantly 
pro-Union constituents.  Westerners hoped that the government could be 
Carolina Watchman, January 15, 1861. 
^Carolina Watchman, January 20, 1861. 
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saved.  They were aware that the "planter-aristocracy" advocated dis- 
union to insure southern rights and revitalize through expansion the 
dying slave institution.  But westerners, as their most distinguished 
leader, Zeb Vance, attested, "felt no great and enduring enthusiasm for 
slavery's preservation"  and moreover, did not desire to leave the 
country they loved to protect it.  The economic growth of western North 
Carolina would not depend upon a healthy slave system.  The diversified 
structure of this economy would follow the pattern of Northern indus- 
trial areas, not that of the cotton planters. However, westerners were 
still emotionally attached to the South. Robert G. Twitty, a strong 
Unionist, admitted that "I am a strong Union man but when they send me 
south it will probably change my notion.  I can do nothing against my 
,  ..48 
own people. 
The first few weeks of 1861 found westerners playing a defen- 
sive role against the expanding influence of the Ellis-Clingman faction. 
This was done primarily through Union meetings, newspaper editorials 
and private correspondence with political leaders.  In early January a 
meeting was held at Organ Church in Rowan County.  Those present were 
asked to vote by secret ballot whether they thought there was sufficient 
cause for North Carolina to secede from the Union.  On January 15, the 
Carolina Watchman published the results of the poll.  The Watchman 
reported that by a vote of 180 - 0 the people recommended that South 
Carolina be censured for seceding, that North Carolina not be armed, and 
47F. W. Johnston, "The Papers of Zebulon B. Vance," Raleigh: 
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that the State should not secede.  The article continued by stating 
that, 
we unhesitatingly assert that this is the sentiment of almost 
every portion of the County, the misrepresentation of the State 
Journal and others notwithstanding.  The people of Rowan are 
utterly opposed to this whole secession movement.^ 
Private correspondence between westerners and political leaders 
offered further evidence that the mountains and western Piedmont were 
still in favor of Union.  Samuel Deaver of Madison County wrote Zeb 
Vance, "concerning the secession movement, Madison County is three- 
fourths Union.  I saw a man from Cherokee today and he says they are 
all Union or about it in his county."   Similarly, C. C. Jones, a 
prominent political leader of Caldwell County, wrote Vance that "North 
Carolina and especially Caldwell and Wilkes are deeply attached to the 
Union."   It is clear from newspaper reports, proceedings of the 
numerous Union meetings, and private correspondence that the old-Whig 
stronghold was determined to repulse secession. 
The plea of westerners for time to reweigh the value of the 
Union offered little comfort to easterners, who were weary of the 
seemingly endless struggle over slavery.  In January, while westerners 
were defending themselves and the Union, North Carolina radicals took 
positive action toward secession.  The citizens of Wilmington organized 
a group to seize control of federal forts Caswell and Johnson.  The 
effort was unsuccessful as Governor Ellis ordered the forts returned 
49 
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to federal authorities.  However, the incident did have great impact 
upon the politics of the State.  As a result of this "abortive seizure" 
and the subsequent fear that the forts would be reinforced with federal 
troops, the Legislature proclaimed, on January 29, that a statewide 
vote would be held to determine whether there should be a convention to 
consider the question of secession, and, if so, to elect delegates to 
that convention.  Discussion over the necessity and meaning of this 
convention would rapidly become the "gut issue" which had been lacking 
in the conservative-radical struggle during the first two months after 
the Presidential election.  This debate dominated the North Carolina 
political scene for the next month. 
North Carolinians expressed three different points of view in 
regard to the calling of a convention. Radicals, of course, were 
greatly in favor of the idea because it was a way to bring about 
secession.  Western conservatives expressed differing opinions.  Some, 
such as Zeb Vance and his law partner, Augustus Summerfield Merrimon, 
felt that secession should be left for the people to decide and that 
politicians should merely do their best to advise them.  Vance and 
Merrimon believed that the calling of a convention was not a disunion 
movement but rather a process by which citizens would become aware of 
the issues and understand for themselves the importance of remaining 
in the Union.  Most westerners were less confident in the peoples' 
ability to make the right decision. Jonathan Worth emphatically 
opposed a convention. Worth exclaimed that, "any convention called by 
the General Assembly to consider the National affairs I regard as 
35 
revolutionary, and I am sure my constituents are not ready for revo- 
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lution for existing causes."   Worth also warned people not to believe 
those who tell them that the convention is called to save the Union. 
"It is called to destroy it.  If you desire to preserve the Union, vote 
no Convention and at the same time be careful for whom you vote as your 
53 representatives." 
The people of the western Piedmont and the mountains region 
again stood against secession. Westerners were convinced that the idea 
of a convention was but another plot by secessionists who realized that 
there must first be a convention if North Carolina was to follow the 
lead of the "cotton states." Western Carolinians would resist any move 
which brought the state closer to leaving the Union.  They asserted 
that the only action which would warrent secession would be if the 
federal government coerced the seceded states back into the Union. 
This would be regarded as unconstitutional and would be degrading to 
the South.  However, no such policy had been initiated and it was 
unlikely that the pusillanimous Buchanan would pursue this course.  For 
this reason Union men of the west generally agreed that a Convention at 
this time would accomplish nothing but to further the interests of 
secessionists.  On February 19, they again united against the demands 
of disunionists.  The Carolina Watchman read, 
We have no hesitation in saying that the Union candidates in Rowan 
will be elected by an overwhelming majority.  The people in every 
portion of the County are thoroughly aroused and will go to the 
52J. G. de Roulac Hamilton, Party Politics in North Carolina, 
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polls with the determination to settle the question of Union or 
disunion, so far as they are concerned, in the most decided 
manner.3^ 
James Sudger, a lawyer from Haywood County, reported that people of the 
western counties were in favor of Union.  He wrote he was confident 
that this district would almost unanimously vote against a Convention. 
Union meetings were again organized to inform the voters on the real 
impact of a convention. People were warned to beware of disunionists 
disguised as moderate men.  They were reminded that secessionists had 
told them that the election of Lincoln would not be cause for dis- 
solution; since that time they had done everything possible to take the 
state out of the Union. Westerners had been deceived once; they would 
not be deceived again. The west voted decisively for pro-Union 
delegates and against the calling of a Convention. Accordingly the 
Convention Bill was defeated by a vote of 47,323 to 46,672. 
The feeling of success enjoyed by Unionists as a result of the 
convention issue was shortlived.  On February 27, it was learned that 
the Washington Peace Conference had failed to adopt any plan of com- 
promise.  Westerners had hoped that the Conference would offer North 
Carolina a way to stay in the Union without having to choose between 
the North and the South.  Zeb Vance revealed the desperation felt by 
most westerners when he exclaimed, "Now what, the Union is dissolved 
of course." Despite this setback westerners, including Vance, worked 
tirelessly for preserving the Union throughout the spring of 1861. 
They continued to have strong hopes that the country could be 
54Carolina Watchman, February 19, 1861. 
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saved, but they also recognized that the Union was more fragile now 
than it ever had been.  On March 5, the Carolina Watchman took a more 
militant position and warned that coercion would be tolerated by no 
Southerner, not even those who had for so long condemned the actions 
of the slave-aristocracy. 
....Another point:  That of coercion of the seceding states, as a 
means of bringing them back into the Union.  The triumph of Union 
men here, if they have triumphed, does not affect this question; 
but believing there is no constitutional power in the government 
for such a measure and that it would be mischieveous in its effects 
for reasons independent of its unauthorised character, the Union 
men of North Carolina are not less opposed to this doctrine because 
they have condemned the actions of the seceding States; nor will 
they fail to resist any attempt to use them for a purpose to ravant 
to their feelings, and to their convictions of duty.... 
Nor do the Union men of North Carolina mean to submit the State 
to an unequal or inferior station in the Union.  They demand and 
will sustain for their mother the position of equality and honor 
she has ever enjoyed, believing that nothing less can preserve that 
amity and good feeling indispensable to the common welfare. 56 
56 Carolina Watchman,  March 5,   1861. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE INAUGURATION TO LINCOLN'S CALL 
FOR TROOPS ON APRIL 15, 1861 
On March 6, the hopes of westerners met another serious set- 
back.  Lincoln's Inaugural Address had proven to be less than 
comforting for those people who had thought he would insure the 
Seceded States against coercion. The Address did not blatantly assert 
that the "cotton States" would be forced back into the Union nor did 
it threaten the existence of slavery.  But Lincoln did promise "to 
collect revenue and to hold, occupy and possess property and places 
belonging to the government."   This implied coercion was interpreted 
by disunionists as a declaration of war. The subsequent propaganda 
drove many "conditional Unionists" to the side of the secessionists. 
Westerners still strongly supported the Union after the 
Inaugural Address, but most realized that their influence was lessened 
with each passing day. T. Page Ricard wrote on March 13, that there 
"is an ominous silence, and I fear, every day's influence is strength- 
ening the Secession ranks."58 Disunionists utilized the failure of the 
Peace Conference and the aggressiveness of Lincoln's address as their 
latest arguments for separation. They stated that the only hope for 
57Sitterson, o£. cit., p. 232. 
58Jones Fuller Papers, T. Page Ricard to Jones Fuller, March 
13, 1861. 
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the South was to unite against the "double dealing" tactics of Lincoln. 
Secessionists professed that war was inevitable and that North Carolina 
would in the end come to the side of southerners because "blood is 
thicker than water." 
Meanwhile, western newspapers urged Union men to stand firm 
and pay no attention to rumors perpetrated by secessionists that 
Lincoln was "...going to make war on the south...is going to free the 
niggers...and wants to put them on an equality with Southern white 
59 
folks, and any amount of such stuff."   The Carolina Watchman and the 
Greensboro Patriot both criticized the state wide secessionist meeting 
held in Goldsboro on March 22 and 23.   These papers agreed that if 
"Southern Rights" men wanted a new expression of the popular voice they 
should seek it in a regular way, not by calling a meeting of disunion- 
ists.  Unionist papers also reminded people that Lincoln had no more 
power to coerce than Buchanan had, and that, in government, he was 
without "friends or funds." 
Westerners were, by mid-March, finding it difficult to defend 
the Union.  On March 12, the Carolina Watchman revealed the sense of 
futility felt by all Unionists. The closing lines of that day's 
editorial read, "Let us stand firm and work like patriots, hoping unto 
the end.  The future historian will award the highest praise to those 
who hold out the longest against the efforts of madmen to destroy this 
..61 
great Country. 
5, 1861. 
59Carolina Watchman, March 25, 1861. 
60Carolina Watchman, April 2, 1861; Greensboro Patriot, April 
61Carolina Watchman, March 12, 1861. 
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During the period between Lincoln's Inaugural Address and his 
call for troops on April 15, "holding out" was exactly what the people 
who opposed the secession movement were doing. They did not succumb to 
the pressure brought forth by disunionists until after Lincoln had 
made it clear that he would use force to resupply the federal forts 
situated within Southern states. Newspapers continued to warn people 
to beware of the hurried actions of the secessionists. Westerners were 
advised by their leaders that there was still time to make judicial 
decisions and that every effort should be made to preserve the Country. 
Unionist sentiment was still very strong in the west before the April 
12 attack on Fort Sumter. 
During the time between the Inaugural Address and Lincoln's 
call for troops, an aggressive campaign to promote disunion was carried 
on by the newly formed "Southern Rights" Party.  Secessionists, however, 
needed one more decisive issue to take North Carolina out of the Union. 
Lincoln indirectly obliged them with his announcement, April 8, that he 
ft") 
intended to resupply Fort Sumter.   Southern extremists interpreted 
this change in policy as a move to prepare the North for war.  Conse- 
quently, on April 12, South Carolinian troops attacked Fort Sumter. 
The following day the garrison surrendered. " Reports of the battle 
filled with fiction and thrills filtered back to the North Carolina 
secessionists, and added to the intensity of their purpose. Westerners 
were generally saddened by the attack on Sumter but they did not 
abandon their hope for Union until April 15, when Lincoln issued an 
62 
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order for 75,000 troops, two regiments from North Carolina, "to coerce" 
the seceded states.  In the minds of Unionists from the western 
counties of North Carolina, this unconstitutional action by Lincoln 
signified the end of the Union. They now believed that they had no 
other alternative than to fight for or against the South; and as 
secessionists had predicted, "westerners" turned their back on the 
Union. 
Leading westerners, with the exception of a few "unconditional 
Unionists," immediately supported the Southern cause.  Zeb Vance later 
recalled that, 
For myself, I will say that I was canvassing for Union with all 
my strength; I was addressing a large and excited crowd, large 
numbers of whom were armed, and literally had my arm extended 
upward in pleading for peace and the Union of our Fathers, when 
the President's call for seventy-five thousand volunteers came. 
When my hand came down from impassioned gesticulation, it fell 
slowly and sadly by that of a Sectionalist.  Immediately, with 
altered voice and manner, I called upon the assembled magnitude 
to volunteer not to fight against but for South Carolina.64 
John A. Gilmer, of Guilford County, wrote that Lincoln's proclamation 
destroyed Union sentiment in this County. "  Jonathan Worth appealed 
to the people of Randolph County to unite in defense of the South 
because it would be inexpedient for the Government to attempt coercion 
by military force.66  In his address to the people of Randolph, Worth 
exposed the remorse of most westerners when he wrote that: 
The President must have known that all of us in the Slave 
States, who in spite of the unfriendly action of the North, had 
barely become able to stand up for the Union would be crushed by 
64Clement Dowd, "The Life of Zebulon Vance" (Charlotte, North 
Carolina, 1897), p. 441. 
65Sitterson, op_. cit., pp. 240-241. 
66Hamilton, op_. cit., p. 136. 
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the first shot he fired against the South.  I believed he still 
desired to protect our rights and preserve the Union, and that he 
had some sympathy with those that he would not voluntarily drive 
us out of the Union—though the President had been elected as a 
partisan, upon one Sectional idea.  I hoped and believed when he 
and his party had gained control of the government, that he would 
be enough of a statesman and patriot to exert his powers to pro- 
tect our rights and preserve the Union. ' 
The Unionist newspapers of western counties immediately 
reversed their policy and declared themselves to be in favor of resis- 
tance.  Lincoln was accused of violating the Constitution by making war 
without the consent of Congress.  His proclamation calling for troops 
was interpreted as a malicious desire to promote civil war between the 
North and South.  Western papers asserted that the President had no 
expectation that the two sections could ever again live peaceably under 
the same government.  On April 23, the Carolina Watchman stated that: 
Old lifelong conservative men, who throughout have labored and 
prayed for a peaceful solution of the national troubles and have 
never once given up all hope, yielded with anguish of the heart 
when they could hold out no longer.  The miserable duplicity of 
Abraham Lincoln stung them to the quick, one and all are freely 
bringing their sons and their treasures to offer on the altar of 
liberty..Who would measure the deep damnation due to those, North 
and South, who have through the years of ceaseless agitation, 
brought this terrible calamity upon us. As there is a just God 
in heaven they will get their reward. 68 
William Holden, as he had in the past, reflected the thoughts 
of all Union men.  He wrote: 
The proclamation of Abraham Lincoln, which we publish today, 
has completed the sectionalization of the Country.  The two 
extremes are now arrayed against each other with warlike purposes, 
and the only hope for peace is in the border States  
67 
68 
Ibid.,   p.   137. 
'Carolina Watchman,  April 23,   1861. 
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Holden called upon Unionists to: 
Unite and command the peace, if possible; if we fail in that, 
we must fight. This is the duty of the border States. They will 
prove equal to the crisis. They can muster five hundred thousand 
fighting men. They will take Washington City, if necessary, and 
hold it; and they will continue the conflict, if it be forced 
upon them, until the present federal government is demolished and 
a new one established on its ruins.^ 
Mr. Lincoln's call for troops undermined the Unionist cause in 
western North Carolina.  This proclamation made "the minds of all 
people run in the same direction,"  and that direction was south.  For 
the many the "critical year" had been one of frustration and confusion. 
For the few it was a year of ambition.  Now, on April 15, 1861, triumph 
belonged to those few alone.  In a few short weeks, however, the horror 
which they had created would belong to everyone. Nearly a century 
later, the British poet Dylan Thomas wrote an appropriate ending to the 
story of Unionist sentiment in the western counties of North Carolina 
from April 1860 to April 1861. 
Thomas wrote: 
"The hand that signed the paper 
felled the city. 
Five sovereign fingers taxed the breath 
Doubled the globe of dead and 
halved the country 
These five kings did a King to death." 
"The five kings count the dead 
but do not soften the crushed wound 
nor stroke the brow. 
The hand rules pity as a hand 
rules heaven. 
Hands have no tears to flow." 
69 North Carolina Standard. 
70. °Mary Shannon Smith, "Unionist Sentiment in North Carolina 
During the Civil War," Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Session of 
the State Literary and Historical Association of North Carolina 
(Raleigh, N.C.:  Edwards and Broughton Printing Co., 1916), p. W. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In the Introduction to this paper it was stated that ante- 
bellum western North Carolina was in the process of changing from a 
subsistance agricultural to a diversified, growing economy.  Conditions 
there, in 1860, foretold of a future more similar to that of the North 
than to the "planter capitalist" system which dominated the South. 
The welfare of westerners would depend upon the sustainment of a highly 
diversified and technologically advanced economy.  This fact helped to 
separate East from West, secession from Union, during the "critical 
year" discussed in this paper. 
The years after the War offer substantial proof that ante- 
bellum western North Carolina was on its way to economic expansion. 
The tobacco industry, headed by the Dukes and Reynolds families, 
expanded rapidly creating a sophisticated commercial agricultural 
system by combining smaller and weaker tobacco men.  The textile 
industry by 1870 was already producing more than it had in 1860, and by 
1880 production would be double.  Yet it was after 1880 that the 
greatest advances in production were cade.  Growing towns which resulted 
from this industrial expansion created new markets for farmers growing 
foodstuffs.  The banking business grew rapidly as investments promisee 
greater and greater returns.  The transportation system was improved 
and the bulk of the state's trading gradually moved westward.  An 
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excellent supply of skilled labor and supervision came from initial 
industries that provided training for men who would become major 
contributors to future North Carolina development. A New Hampshire 
mill man attributed the great success in this area "not to long hours 
of work and low pay, nor to unintelligent workers, as labor unions 
would have this country believe, but to efficient management.  By 
efficient management I mean 100 per cent efficiency."   Labor came 
principly from the mountain country and the tenant classes of the 
Piedmont.  These people, "like the original New Englanders, have worked 
hard to make a living, and appreciate opportunity. They are of great 
native intelligence and quick to learn."   All of these factors, 
industrial expansion, new markets, better banking and investments 
facilities, commercial trading, and an exceptional source of super- 
vision and labor helped western North Carolina to sustain a period of 
phenomenal growth following the Civil War. 
This remarkable growth began in 1860 in this region where nature 
had denied any profitable use of slavery.  In time the area would rank 
first in the South in all aspects of industrial development.  It would 
be first in the United States in textile manufacturing and monopolize 
almost every phase of the tobacco industry.  By the end of the nine- 
teenth century, this region was contributing four-fifths of the state's 
industrial output. The fact that it was economically expedient for the 
71Samuel Huntington Hobbs, Jr., North Carolina - Economic gnd 
Social (Chapel Hill, N.C.:  University of North Carolina Press, 1930), 
p. 147. 
72 Ibid., p. 147. 
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west to stay in the Union led to little enthusiasm for the expansion 
of slavery or secession.  Between April 1860 and April 1861 western 
Carolinians made every attempt to stay within the Union. However, when 
President Lincoln called for troops from North Carolina they responded 
as Southerners and went with their section. 
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